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59 
PROPERTY RIGHTS—WHEN REFORM IS NOT ENOUGH: A LOOK 
INSIDE THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 
REFORM ACT OF 20001 
Imagine you own a million-dollar piece of property free and clear, 
but then the federal government and local law enforcement agents 
announce that they are going to take it from you, not compensate you 
one dime, and then use the money they get from selling your land to 
pad their budgets—all this even though you have never so much as 
been accused of a crime, let alone convicted of one.2 
INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 
2000 (hereinafter “Act” or “CAFRA”),3 it was seen as “a major step 
toward reforming the federal forfeiture system.”4  However, it is 
important to caution against such a general assertion in the face of the 
ongoing abuses of civil forfeiture that have continued to plague innocent 
property owners fourteen years after enactment of the Act.5  Civil 
forfeiture allows the government to seize property that it suspects has 
been involved in the facilitation of a crime and has long been intended 
“to take the ‘offending property’ away from the malefactor, thereby 
depriving the wrongdoer of his or her incentive and ability to commit 
future crimes or other misdeeds.”6  While the Act was intended to 
 
1. The author cautions that this Note provides examples of egregious abuse of the 
practice of civil asset forfeiture, on which calls for reform are based.  There are plenty of 
legitimate exercises of civil asset forfeiture proceedings that law enforcement officials carry 
out on a regular basis. See United States v. $159,880.00 in U.S. Currency, More or Less, 387 
F. Supp. 2d 1000 (S.D. Iowa 2005); United States v. Six Thousand Two Hundred Seven 
($6,207) Dollars in United States Currency, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (M.D. Ala. 2010). 
2. United States v. 434 Main Street, Tewksbury, Mass. (The Motel Caswell) Federal & 
Local Law Enforcement Agencies Try to Take Family Motel from Innocent Owners, INST. FOR 
JUST., http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture [hereinafter The Motel Caswell] (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
3. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). 
4. Steven L. Kessler, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, KESSLER ON 
FORFEITURE, www.kessleronforfeiture.com/civil-asset-forfeiture-reform-act-of-2000/ (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
5. See Sarah Stillman, Taken, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken. 
6. Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution 
to the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 241 (1994). See also Civil 
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subject the ill-gotten gains of drug cartel members to forfeiture, its 
ultimate effect has been to subject the property of everyday citizens to 
civil asset forfeiture.7  Such forfeiture can occur even when the property 
owners themselves have not been involved in any illegal activity.8 
Take, for example, the story of the Caswell family, who owns the 
Motel Caswell in Tewksbury, Massachusetts.9  The Caswells have 
owned the motel for two generations and previously worked with 
members of state and local law enforcement in an effort to prevent, and 
in some cases report, crime that occurred on their property.10  With that 
as a backdrop, imagine the Caswells’ surprise when they learned that 
their local police department partnered with the Department of Justice to 
seize and sell the Motel Caswell simply because a small percentage of 
their guests had been arrested for drug-related crimes while staying on 
their property.11  In reality, over the fourteen-year period in question, 
there were more than one hundred and ninety-six thousand rooms rented 
at the Motel Caswell, and only fifteen drug-related arrests were made.12 
Why would the local law enforcement officials, with whom the 
Caswells had worked with in the past, target and seize a locally owned 
and run piece of property that had such a minimal connection to crime?  
The answer seems to be purely profit driven.13  If the government were 
 
Forfeiture the Grabbing Hand of the Law: How Prosecutors Seize the Assets of the Innocent,  
ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21588915-how-prosecutors-seize-assets-innocent-grabbing-hand-law (highlighting that, 
“[i]n criminal cases, the government can confiscate assets only after a conviction.  Under 
‘civil forfeiture’, however, it can grab first and ask questions later.  Property can be seized 
merely on the suspicion that it has been involved in a crime.”). 
7. See Stephen J. Dunn, Nothing Civil About Asset Forfeiture, FORBES, Feb. 18, 2013, 
available at www.forbes.com/sites/stephendunn/2013/02/18/asset-forfeiture-is-anything-but-
civil/.  
8. See Id. (“[i]t is clear from the legislative history of CAFRA that Congress intended to 
limit civil forfeitures to alleged structuring connected with an underlying offense of drug 
trafficking or money laundering”).  
9. The Motel Caswell, supra note 2. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (D. Mass. 2013); see also 
Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse: Federal & Local Law Enforcement Agencies Try to Take 
Family Motel from Innocent Owners, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civil-
forfeiture-background (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (the number of arrests that the government 
based their case upon represented less than .05 percent of the total rooms rented at the Motel 
Caswell over the period of time in question). 
13. Civil Forfeiture Abuse Case to be Argued Today before Federal Court in Boston, 
INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture-release-2-13-2012 (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2015) (quoting Larry Salzman, one of the Caswell’s attorneys, “[w]hat the 
government is doing amounts to little more than a grab for what they saw as quick cash under 
the guise of [civil] forfeiture”). 
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to succeed in obtaining the Motel Caswell through civil forfeiture, the 
Tewksbury Police Department would receive almost one million dollars 
through their work with the Department of Justice.14  The police 
department would obtain this revenue through the sale of the property, 
while the rest of the profit would remain with the federal government.15 
The Caswells, whose main source of income derived from the hotel 
itself, had devoted their careers to owning and managing the motel.16  
With the property’s seizure, they began to question how they would 
afford the legal fight to retain their property.17  Unlike the case for most 
property owners in similar situations, a public interest law firm that 
specializes in fighting against the abuse of civil asset forfeiture 
nationwide stepped in to aid the Caswells in their fight against the 
forfeiture of their property.18  The Caswells were eventually successful 
in their opposition to the forfeiture, as a federal judge found that law 
enforcement had grossly exaggerated the evidence and ruled that the 
property was not subject to forfeiture.19  While this victory was deemed 
successful for the Caswell family, the real issues surrounding this case 
plague innocent property owners across the nation.20  The simple fact is 
that based on the minimal amount of evidence produced by state and 
federal officials, the property should never have been subjected to 
potential forfeiture in the first place.21 
Another example of the abuse of civil forfeiture laws is the story of 
Rochelle Bing, a forty-two-year-old grandmother who spends her time 
working as a home health aide and as a babysitter for her 
grandchildren.22  Bing purchased her home with the intention that it 
 
14. Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse Federal & Local Law Enforcement Agencies Try to 
Take Family Motel from Innocent Owners, supra note 12. 
15. Id. (“Civil forfeiture creates a perverse incentive for police to target innocent 
owners and their assets rather than aiming for justice and public safety.”); see also George F. 
Will, When Government is the Looter, WASH. POST, May 18, 2012, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-government-is-the-looter/2012/05/18/ 
gIQAUIKVZU_story.html. 
16. The Motel Caswell, supra note 2. 
17. Id. 
18. Id.  See generally Stillman, supra note 5 (because the cost of litigation often far 
exceeds the value of the property seized, those who have had their property wrongfully seized 
through civil forfeiture are more likely not to pursue using the legal system as a remedy to 
retain their property). 
19. United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp .2d 298, 315 (D. Mass. 2013); see also 
The Motel Caswell, supra note 2. 
20. See Stillman, supra note 5. 
21. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20. 
22. Isaiah Thompson, Forfeiture Laws Ruin Lives, PROPUBLICA: JOURNALISM PUB. 
INT. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/08/05/government_seizes_homes_of_the_ 
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would become a safe haven for her children and grandchildren if any one 
of them were to fall upon tough times.23  Unfortunately for Bing, an 
incident in October of 2009 derailed her plans.24  After one of her 
children was caught selling crack cocaine to an undercover police 
informant on Bing’s property on two occasions, police searched Bing’s 
home.25  Bing was never charged with a crime and was not present at the 
time of the encounter between her son and the police informant.26  Even 
so, police sought to seize her home simply because it was the site of the 
alleged drug deal.27  Bing was sent a letter informing her that she had 
just thirty days to convince a judge to allow her to keep her home, and if 
she was unable to do so she would be forced to vacate the premises.28 
Bing was appalled by the injustice, and, unlike many property 
owners in her situation, she sought to fight back against the forfeiture of 
her home.29  She soon realized why such a large percentage of property 
owners who have had their property seized through civil forfeiture 
choose not to oppose the seizure when it became apparent that the fight 
to retain her property would be long and expensive.30  Over the course of 
the next two years, Bing’s attorney appeared in court on her behalf 
twenty-three times before the prosecutor agreed to settle her case.31  In 
the end, Bing was allowed to keep her home as long as she agreed to not 
allow her son in the house when she was not present.32  Ironically, after 
being dragged through court for two years and constantly faced with the 
fear of losing her home, Bing said if she could do it again, she would 
have consented to that agreement in the first place.33 
Stories such as that of the Caswell family and Rochelle Bing are all 
too common under civil forfeiture laws today.34  This Note addresses 
 
innocent_under_forfeiture_laws_partner/. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.  Following the arrest of her son, no additional drugs were found during the 
search of Bing’s home.  However, unused packaging, suspected to be what the drugs were 
placed in for sale, was found in a bedroom. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id.  Fortunately for Bing, who was unable to afford legal counsel, her case was 
referred to the legal clinic at the University of Pennsylvania, where she was represented by 
law students free of charge. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See, e.g., Nick Sibilla, Florida Cops Made Millions Dealing Cocaine: The Latest 
Asset Forfeiture Outrage, FORBES, Oct. 30, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
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some of the lingering issues following the implementation of CAFRA35 
and advocates for further reform.36  Many questions still remain about 
the way enforcement of the Act is established and carried out, which is 
contrary to Congress’ intent in implementing the Act.37 
This Note examines the shortcomings of the CAFRA, highlighting 
the injustices that innocent property owners are subjected to through the 
practice of civil asset forfeiture.38  Specifically, this Note addresses the 
problems under the Act with the preliminary burden of proof on the 
government currently required to perform an initial seizure of property.  
This Note also advocates for a change in the preliminary burden of proof 
that would require the government to overcome a higher burden. 
Section I traces the history of civil forfeiture laws in this country.  
Specifically, this section addresses the evolution of attributing guilt to 
the property itself along with the right of the government to acquire the 
property through seizure.  Furthermore, Section I discusses how the 
system has now reached the point of requiring reform to civil asset 
forfeiture laws. 
Section II confronts the lingering questions that have resulted from 
CAFRA.  This Note argues that the government’s preliminary burden of 
proof remains too low, and that such a standard enables questionable 
motives of law enforcement’s seizures of property.  This Note also 
 
instituteforjustice/2013/10/30/florida-cops-made-millions-dealing-cocaine-the-latest-asset-
forfeiture-outrage/ (highlighting that law enforcement in Sunrise, Florida, “conduct ‘reverse’ 
sting operations, posing as drug dealers to lure buyers with promises of cheap cocaine.  Once 
the deals go down, cops bust the buyers, and using state and federal forfeiture laws, seize their 
cash and cars.”); Joi Elizabeth Peake, Note, Bound By the Sins of Another: Civil Forfeiture 
and the Lack of Constitutional Protection for Innocent Owners in Bennis v. Michigan, 75 N.C. 
L. REV. 662, 663-64 (1997). Portraying a similar scenario: 
In an unfortunate example, Florida officials seized $19,000 from Selena 
Washington, a South Carolina Citizen who was carrying cash on her trip to buy 
building materials . . . [a]fter stopping Ms. Washington as she traveled down a 
Florida Interstate . . . police seized the cash as suspected drug money.  The 
officer did not take Ms. Washington’s name or give her a receipt; he merely took 
the money and sped away.  After lengthy negotiations, Ms. Washington settled 
with the officials, an alternative cheaper than an extended legal battle; the sheriff 
kept $4,000, her attorney got $1,200 and Ms. Washington got back only $13,800. 
Id. at 663-64; Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Michael Sallah, They Fought the Law. Who Won?, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 8, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/ 
investigative/2014/09/08/they-fought-the-law-who-won/.  
35. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). 
36. See id. (establishing the statutory language set forth by Congress under CAFRA). 
37. See Louis S. Rulli, The Long Term Impact of CAFRA: Expanding Access to Counsel 
and Encouraging Greater Use of Criminal Forfeiture, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 87 (2001).  
(“Civil forfeiture practices drew sharp criticism because they did not contain basic safeguards 
required in criminal cases, thereby placing ordinary citizens at substantial risk for the loss of 
their property without any evidence of criminal wrongdoing”). 
38. 18 U.S.C. § 983. 
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addresses the fact that the “equitable sharing” program in place under 
CAFRA allows for state and local law enforcement officials to bypass 
stricter state civil forfeiture laws in favor of easier to fulfill federal 
standards which allow for potential profit.39  Section II also discusses the 
dangers associated with profits made from civil forfeiture going 
undocumented in law enforcement budgets.  Finally, it illustrates that the 
current system relies heavily on incentives that are directly adverse to 
public policy, and which further public mistrust of government officials 
when it comes to civil asset forfeiture.40 
Section III of this Note suggests how further reform of CAFRA will 
serve to legitimize the practice of civil forfeiture.  It recommends that 
establishing a higher preliminary burden of proof for the government 
will provide greater protection for the general public, and ensures that 
doing so will result in more legitimate cases being brought to court.  
This Note also proposes the elimination of the controversial “equitable 
sharing” program so that state and local law enforcement officials would 
no longer be able to bypass tougher state laws in favor of federal laws 
that provide them with an easier burden.  Finally, Section III 
recommends requiring full disclosure of where the funds from civilly 
forfeited property are allocated within law enforcement budgets.  Doing 
so will eliminate the practice of “policing for profit[,]”41 and will abolish 
the incentive-based system that raises questions as to the motives of law 
enforcement in such cases.42 
I. THE STATE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS: WHY REFORM OF 
ESTABLISHED LAWS WAS NECESSARY 
Although civil asset forfeiture has long been a staple practice within 
this country,43 until recently it has not garnered enough attention to 
generate concern from the general public.  Just prior to Congress’s 
 
39. 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) (2012).  
40. See Dick M. Carpenter II, Larry Salzman & Lisa Knepper, Inequitable Justice: How 
Federal “Equitable Sharing” Encourages Local Police and Prosecutors to Evade State Civil 
Forfeiture Law for Financial Gain, INST. FOR JUST. (Oct. 2011), http://www.ij.org/images/ 
pdf_folder/private_property/forfeiture/ inequitable_justice-mass-forfeiture.pdf. 
41. See Marian R. Williams, Jefferson E. Holcomb, Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Scott 
Bullock, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. 7 (Mar. 
2010), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf 
(establishing that “policing for profit” occurs, “when state laws make forfeiture more difficult 
and less rewarding, [therefore] law enforcement instead takes advantage of easier and more 
generous federal forfeiture laws.”). 
42. See infra Section III. 
43. See generally Michele M. Jochner, The Supreme Court Turns Back the Clock on 
Civil Forfeiture in Bennis, 85 ILL. B. J. 314 (2002). 
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adoption of CAFRA,44 there came public cries for a change in the type of 
assets that could be subjected to this practice.45 However, CAFRA has 
not done enough to quell the concern over the state of civil asset 
forfeiture law in this country, as many have voiced worry as to whether 
the Act goes far enough to protect innocent property owners.46 
This section of the Note traces the history of civil asset forfeiture 
within the United States and establishes what led to Congress adopting 
more defined standards under CAFRA.47  Part I.A, of this Note, provides 
a broad overview of how civil asset forfeiture works, and how law 
enforcement agencies are able to confiscate property through the 
practice.  Part I.B highlights the earliest evidence of the exercise of civil 
asset forfeiture in this country and traces the practice to its roots in 
British jurisprudence.  Part I.C works to analyze the state of modern civil 
asset forfeiture law prior to CAFRA reform and outlines the many issues 
that made reform necessary in the first place.  Part I.D establishes the 
legislative history leading to the proposal for civil asset forfeiture reform 
and highlights the concessions that both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate made in order to pass the Act.  Additionally, Part I.D 
focuses on the initial reaction to CAFRA reform and illustrates that it is 
possible that CAFRA, while a step in the right direction, did not do 
enough to respond to concerns over potential abuses of the practice. 
A. Broad Overview of a Civil Asset Forfeiture Proceeding 
There are two routes that may be taken to effectuate the seizure of 
property through a forfeiture action: an in rem proceeding or an in 
personam proceeding.48  Any crime can trigger a forfeiture action.49  In 
 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). 
45. See The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Roger Pilon, Senior Fellow at the 
Cato Institute), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/ congressional-testimony/civil-
asset-forfeiture-reform-act-0 (“About the only people who defend forfeiture law today are 
those in law enforcement who benefit from it, either as a ‘tool of their trade’ or, more directly, 
by keeping the goods they seize—a conflict of interest so stark that it takes us to another age. 
In fact, that is just the problem with modern forfeiture law: in practice as well as in theory, its 
roots are in notions that have no place whatever in our legal system, animistic and 
authoritarian notions that countless people have died over the ages to bury and replace with 
the rule of law.”). 
46. Id. 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 983. 
48. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22005, CRIME AND FORFEITURE 
(2013) at 2 (establishing that modern forfeiture can take place in one of two ways: an in rem 
proceeding which establishes the offending property as the defendant or an in personam 
proceeding in which forfeiture occurs on conviction of the property owner). 
49. Id. at 3 (“Virtually every kind of property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, 
may be subject to confiscation under the appropriate circumstances.”). 
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each particular incident, the character of the offense that prompted the 
forfeiture will determine whether the property or property owner will 
face civil or criminal forfeiture.50  In an in rem civil forfeiture 
proceeding, the property is “treated as the offender” and becomes the 
defendant in the case.51  In fact, in an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding, 
the fact that property in question was involved in a crime, which calls for 
forfeiture, is enough to subject it to a forfeiture proceeding.52  On the 
other hand, in the case of a criminal forfeiture, the property in question 
may only be surrendered upon a conviction of the property owner on a 
charge relating to the confiscation of the property.53 
With civil asset forfeiture, as the action is brought against the 
property itself and the property owner need not be convicted of a crime 
to have his or her property seized; the proceeding is not subjected to the 
more challenging criminal procedure standard.54  When the property is 
seized through civil forfeiture, 
[s]worn statements (affidavits) concerning the circumstances of the 
seizure are typically prepared by government employees, such as 
police officers or FBI agents.  These statements (explaining, for 
example, the legal basis for an initial vehicle stop and what the 
officer observed such as the smell of burning marijuana) are 
presented to courts to link the property in question to the underlying 
criminal behavior, thus allowing forfeiture.  Forfeiture challenges are 
costly and time consuming.  Some travelers have reported threats of 
unjustified or highly suspect criminal charges and other actions 
unless they surrendered property on the spot with a signed waiver.55 
When assets are seized through civil forfeiture, the burden of proof 
is on the property owner to prove that the property has no connection to 
illegal activity or that the owner was unaware that the property was tied 
to the activity in question.56  Also, there are a number of procedural 
deadlines that a property owner faces in an attempt to retain his or her 
property under current civil asset forfeiture laws,57 which could 
potentially lead to the property owner forfeiting the seized assets by 
 
50. Id. at 5. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 5-6. 
53. Id. at 6. 
54. Brad Reid, An Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Recent Cases, HUFF. POST 
(Aug. 14, 2013, 7:03 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-reid/civil-asset-forfeiture-
ch_b_3745209.html. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). 
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B. The Origin of Civil Asset Forfeiture in the United States 
Today’s version of asset forfeiture law can be linked directly to its 
foundations in the laws of early England.59  It stems from “three early 
English procedures: deodands, forfeiture of estate or common law 
forfeiture, and statutory or commercial forfeiture.”60  Under English law, 
“a chattel (be it an animal or inanimate object) was deemed to be a 
deodand whenever a coroner’s jury decided that it had caused the death 
of a human being.  [And also established that] [d]eodands were 
automatically forfeit[ed] to the crown.”61  History suggests that though 
the colonists in the American colonies were not subjected to the deodand 
rules, these rules had a significant impact on influencing the distinct 
qualities of modern civil asset forfeiture laws.62 
The second of the English procedures that influenced the American 
practice, forfeiture of estate or common law forfeiture, focused less on 
the property in question.63  Instead, English procedure concentrated on 
the property owner as the offender, stating “[a]t common law, anyone 
convicted and attained for treason or a felony forfeited all his lands and 
personal property.”64  The final procedure of early English common law 
that had an impact on modern day civil asset forfeiture was statutory or 
commercial forfeiture, which was used extensively in the American 
colonies and again pegged the property in question as the offending 
party instead of the property’s owner.65 
History establishes that even at that time, colonists did not agree 
with the practice of statutory or commercial forfeiture, suggesting that, 
“American colonists, particularly business owners, objected to general 
‘writs of assistance’ issued by British authorities that allowed broad 
searches and the subsequent seizures of discovered property suspected of 
 
58. Reid, supra note 54. 
59. DOYLE, supra note 48, at 1. 
60. Id.; see The Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes the term deodand as “a thing 
that by English law before 1846 was forfeited to the crown and thence to pious uses because it 
had been the immediate cause of death of a person.”  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deodand; see also DOYLE, supra 
note 48, at 1 (establishing, “[a]t early common law, the object that caused the death of a 
human being—the ox that gored, the knife that stabbed, or the cart that crushed—was 
confiscated as a deodand.”). 
61. Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. no. 3, 237, 237 (2005). 
62. DOYLE, supra note 48, at 1. 
63. Id. at 2. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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being associated with smuggling or other crimes.”66  However, 
regardless of the colonists’ displeasure for the procedure, this type of 
asset forfeiture in connection with crimes had a tremendous impact on 
modern asset forfeiture laws. 
Civil asset forfeiture has a long history within this country, but the 
practice played an insignificant role in the United States’ justice system 
until the early 1970s.67  With the passage of the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,68 the United States embraced 
statutory forfeiture and revived these types of common law 
proceedings.69 
C. Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture Law Prior to the Introduction of 
CAFRA 
Civil asset forfeiture was brought to the forefront due, in part, to the 
nation’s sweeping interest in the “War on Drugs.”70  Such forfeitures 
were made possible under § 881(a) of the Comprehensive Drug Control 
Act of 1970.71  The earliest version of the statute was narrow, and 
“provided for the forfeiture of conveyances only; it did not permit the 
forfeiture of money, negotiable securities, or real property.”72  However, 
as the years progressed, a number of amendments to the original statute 
served to help the law become a much more powerful tool for law 
enforcement officials.73  The revision significantly increased the amount 
of property subject to forfeiture under § 881(a), including: 
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which 
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to 
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment 
 
66. Reid, supra note 54. 
67. Alice Marie O’Brien, Caught in the Crossfire: Protecting the Innocent Owner of 
Real Property from Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. S 881(A)(7), 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521, 
524-25 (1991). 
68. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012). 
69. See Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility- The Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 1045, 1048 (2002) (citing U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, n. 7 (1998) (establishing 
that, with the passing of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 
“Congress resurrected the English common law of punitive forfeiture to combat organized 
crime and major drug trafficking. . . . the Senate Judiciary Committee admitted that the revival 
of these common law proceedings ‘represents an innovative attempt to call on our common 
law heritage to meet an essentially modern problem.’”)). 
70. Id.; see also, for a brief history into the coining of the term “War on Drugs,” A Brief 
History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE (2014), http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-
solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
71. Johnson, supra note 69.  See also 21 U.S.C. § 881. 
72. Johnson, supra note 69, at 1049 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1970)). 
73. Id. 
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of property. 
. . . . 
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of 
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in 
exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of 
this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all 
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be 
used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter. 
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including 
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and 
any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be 
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the 
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more 
than one year’s imprisonment.74 
With these revisions came increased criticism over the state of the 
civil asset forfeiture laws.75  Specifically, the statute drew criticism over 
the lack of a notice requirement, the lack of Constitutional protection for 
innocent owners, and the low preliminary burden of proof on the 
government required for the initial seizure of the property.76 
The inclusion of § 881(a)(7) in the revision of the statute drew 
major opposition,77 because under this section all real property could be 
seized without prior notice if law enforcement deemed that it had been 
used or it had intended to be used in the facilitation of a crime.78  The 
Supreme Court did not address this issue until 1993, in United States v. 
James Daniel Good Real Property, when the Court ruled, 
that the seizure of real property under § 881(a)(7) is not one of those 
extraordinary instances that justify the postponement of notice and 
hearing.  Unless exigent circumstances are present, the Due Process 
Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil 
forfeiture.79 
However, the Court’s ruling in Good, that notice is required for the 
seizure of property, is not as broadly interpreted and applied as it may 
seem.80  Consequently, under the revised Controlled Substances Act,81 
 
74. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (emphasis added). 
75. Johnson, supra note 69 at 1052. 
76. Id. at 1054-55; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453-54 (Thomas, 
concurring) (1996). 
77. Johnson, supra note 69 at 1057-58.  
78. 21 U.S.C. § 881. 
79. 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993). 
80. Id. 
81. 21 U.S.C. § 881. 
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property was still regularly seized by law enforcement officials with no 
notice whatsoever.82 
Additional criticism of the Act stemmed from the lack of protection 
given to innocent owners who were unaware of, or could not reasonably 
foresee, any criminal activity that their property may be involved in.83  
Such owners, however, could still have their property forfeited based on 
the conduct of a third party.84  Initially, it seemed as though § 881(a) of 
the Controlled Substances Act would provide greater protection to the 
innocent property owner, as there has been an innocent owner provision 
included in the Act since its implementation.85  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court alluded to this protection as a constitutional mandate in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.86  The Court stated that it would be 
tough to refuse a constitutional claim when, 
[a]n owner . . . proved not only that he was uninvolved in and 
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that 
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his 
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude 
that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly 
oppressive.87 
Many interpreted the Supreme Court ruling as establishing that the 
Constitution mandated such an “innocent owner” defense when all 
elements for the status of “innocent owner” were met.88 
The idea that that the innocent owner defense was mandated by the 
Constitution prevailed until 1996, when the Court, in Bennis v. 
Michigan, ruled that the innocent owner defense was not required by the 
Constitution.89  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
 
82. Johnson, supra note 69, at 1052. 
83. Id. at 1054. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); see also 
Johnson, supra note 69, at 1054 (“In Calero-Toledo, the Puerto Rican government initiated 
forfeiture proceedings against a $19,800 rental yacht following the discovery of one marijuana 
cigarette that belonged to the individual renting the yacht.  The Court upheld the forfeiture 
even though all parties conceded the owner ‘had no knowledge that its property was being 
used in connection with or in violation of (Puerto Rican Law).’”) (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 
U.S. at 668). 
87. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90. 
88. Johnson, supra note 69, at 1054. 
89. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).  For the facts of the case see Peake, supra 
note 34, at 666 (establishing that, “Michigan officials sought the forfeiture of an automobile 
after it was used in prostitution in violation of Michigan’s indecency statutes.  John Bennis 
was arrested after police saw him engaging in sexual activity with a prostitute in a parked car.  
The car was owned jointly by John Bennis and his wife, Tina Bennis.  Tina Bennis entrusted 
the car to her husband for transportation to and from work, but did not know that he would use 
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established that forfeiture laws, without the inclusion of an innocent 
owner defense, were not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause,90 nor were they in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.91  Chief Justice Rehnquist “grounded the 
decision on the historical legal fiction that ‘the thing is here primarily 
considered as the offender’. . . . The majority reasoned that the failure to 
protect innocent owners was justified by the important governmental 
interest in deterring illegal activity.”92  Thus, the ruling in Bennis 
seemingly became the cause of greater confusion as to what types of 
property could or could not be protected under the innocent owner 
defense, and many still saw room for abuse of the statute under the 
Court’s decision.93 
The final pre-forfeiture reform problem that impacted the state of 
civil asset forfeiture law concerns the preliminary burden of proof that 
the government had to meet in order to seize the property.94  Prior to 
CAFRA, under the Controlled Substances Act, “all property was deemed 
forfeit[ed] once the government showed probable cause that that 
property was used to facilitate a narcotics crime or was derived from a 
narcotics crime.”95  With such a low preliminary burden of proof upon 
the government96 the potential for abuse of the statute soared.97 
 
it to violate the indecency laws.  After John Bennis’ conviction for gross indecency, the State 
of Michigan sued to have the car abated as a public nuisance, calling for forfeiture of the car 
to the state.”). 
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Peake, supra note 34 at 667; Fifth Amendment: An 
Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_amendment 
(describing the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as “[w]hile the federal government has a 
constitutional right to ‘take’ private property for public use, the Fifth Amendment’s Just 
Compensation Clause requires the government to pay just compensation, interpreted as market 
value, to the owner of the property.”). 
92. Peake, supra note 34, at 667-68 (quoting Bennis, 516 U.S. at 447). 
93. See id. at 668-69 (Bennis, 516 U.S. at 456 (Thomas, J., concurring) (highlighting 
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion which stated, “[i]mproperly used, forfeiture could 
become more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless 
owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who 
associate with criminals, than a component of a system of justice.”)). But see Bennis, 516 U.S. 
at 458 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stephens saw the need for a wide-ranging innocent 
owner defense, stating that “[t]he logic of the Court’s analysis would permit the States to 
exercise virtually unbridled power to confiscate vast amounts of property where professional 
criminals have engaged in illegal acts.”). 
94. Johnson, supra note 69, at 1058. 
95. Id. (emphasis added); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012). 
96. An anonymous tip was generally held to be enough to constitute probable cause. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 16 n. 67 (1999). 
97. See Johnson, supra note 69 at 1058-59 (exemplifying the potential for abuse under 
such a low burden, “[f]or example, in Boston, thirteen members of the S.W.A.T. team raided 
Rev. Accelynne Williams’ apartment searching for drugs and guns, but found none.  Rev. 
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Once the government has met the burden of probable cause, the 
burden then shifts to the property owner to establish that his or her 
property is not subject to forfeiture, which is a much more challenging 
standard to meet.98  By default, it is simply more difficult to prove that 
something did not happen or that property was not involved in a crime 
than to meet the preliminary probable cause burden.99  The ever-growing 
concern over the preliminary burden of proof placed upon the 
government was an important part of the call for asset forfeiture reform, 
and such concerns were addressed in the earliest versions of reform 
proposals.100 
D. The Introduction of Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform 
As early as the first part of the 1990s, it became clear that federal 
civil asset forfeiture laws were primed and ready for large-scale 
reform.101  Though former President Bill Clinton did not sign the Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 into law until April 25, 2000, early 
versions of the Act were first introduced well before then.102  
Representatives Henry Hyde, a Republican, and John Conyers, a 
Democrat, were the first to initiate civil asset forfeiture reform.  
Representative Hyde was concerned with the fact that very little had 
been done to protect innocent property owners and stated, “startling 
abuses of fundamental fairness [have not] ceased to occur.”103  Further, 
Representative Hyde expressed apprehension over the fact that abuse of 
civil asset forfeiture laws has a negative impact on public policy, and 
does not serve to further the objectives of policy decisions of the 
 
Williams, who was seventy-five years old, died of a heart attack after being ‘secured’ on the 
floor by three police officers.  As it turned out, the confidential informant who provided the 
probable cause had been drunk the night he visited a drug den and was mistaken about the 
identity and location of the malefactors.  The police, of course, not being required to meet a 
higher standard of proof than probable cause, did not investigate further.”); see also Sara 
Rimer, Minister Who Sought Peace Dies in a Botched Drug Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/28/us/minister-who-sought-peace-dies-in-a-botched-drug-
raid.html. 
98. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). 
99. See Johnson, supra note 69, at 1059 (noting that, “[i]t is much easier for the 
government to prove that such an event might (the statute only required probable cause) have 
happened than for the owner to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that this chain of 
events never happened.”).  
100. Id. 
101. Kessler, supra note 4. 
102. See id. 
103. Henry Hyde, Statement of Rep Henry Hyde, “Forfeiture Reform: Now, or 
Never?”, ACLU (May 3, 1999), https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/statement-rep-
henry-hyde-forfeiture-reform-now-or-never. 
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government.104  Additionally, Representative Conyers was further 
concerned with the ability of police forces to funnel forfeited funds into 
their budgets.105 
In the early drafts of the proposal, the Representatives wanted to 
impose strict regulations on law enforcement officials in potential asset 
forfeiture situations.106  Representatives Hyde and Conyers initially 
called for a “clear and convincing” evidentiary burden on the 
government,107 which would mark a stark increase in the evidentiary 
requirement from the original “probable cause” burden under the then 
current standards.108  The Representatives were concerned with the fact 
that under the forfeiture laws at the time, the government was required to 
prove almost nothing, while the higher burden landed squarely on the 
property owner who opposes and must defend against the forfeiture of 
his or her property.109 
It soon became clear, however, that the Senate was not willing to 
pass a bill that called for the government to meet a “clear and 
convincing” preliminary burden of proof.110  Shortly thereafter, 
Representatives Hyde and Conyers settled upon the “preponderance of 
the evidence” evidentiary burden, which was more stringent than 
previous asset forfeiture law requirements, but not quite as strict as a 
“clear and convincing” burden would have required.111 
With the bill, the Representatives also sought to tackle other 
controversial aspects of civil asset forfeiture laws that were in effect.112  
 
104. Id. 
105. Cornell University Law School, Forfeiture, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forfeiture. 
106. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 3, 114 STAT. 
202, 212 (2000). 
107. Cornell University Law School, Clear and Convincing Evidence, LEGAL INFO. 
INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_evidence (defining “clear and 
convincing” as, “a medium level of burden of proof . . . . In order to meet the standard and 
prove something by clear and convincing evidence, a party must prove that it is substantially 
more likely than not that it is true.”). 
108. Cornell University Law School, Probable Cause, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (establishing that courts, “usually find 
probable cause when there is a reasonable basis for believing that a crime may have been 
committed (for arrest) and that evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched (for 
search).”); Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act § 5, 114 STAT. at 213. 
109. See Hyde, supra note 103 (stating that, “[i]n civil forfeiture cases, where claimants 
are required to go forward with evidence and exculpate their property by a preponderance of 
the evidence, all risks are squarely on the claimant.  The government, under the current 
approach, need not produce any admissible evidence and may deprive citizens of property 
based on the rankest of hearsay and the flimsiest evidence.”). 
110. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 12. 
111. Id. 
112. Hyde, supra note 103. 
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Another of their proposals was to provide a blanket innocent owner 
defense for all property owners involved in federal civil asset forfeiture 
situations.113  Representative Hyde stated, 
An innocent owner defense is required by fundamental fairness.  My 
bill provides that an innocent owner’s interest in property shall not 
be forfeited in any civil forfeiture action.  An owner would be 
considered innocent if he did not know of the conduct giving rise to 
the forfeiture or upon learning of such conduct, did all that 
reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate 
such use.  An owner is considered to have taken all the steps that a 
reasonable person would take if the owner, to the extent permitted by 
law (1) gave timely notice to an appropriate law enforcement agency 
of information that led the owner to know that the conduct giving 
rise to forfeiture would occur or has occurred, and (2) in a timely 
fashion, revoked or attempted to revoke permission for those 
engaging in such conduct to use the property or took reasonable steps 
in consultation with a law enforcement agency to discourage or 
prevent the illegal use.114 
The innocent owner defense, which Representative Hyde believed 
would go a long way in the protection of innocent property owners, was 
accepted.115  Subsequently, CAFRA contains a specific innocent owner 
provision: noting that property owners who have undertaken reasonable 
precautions in the prevention of illegal activities cannot be subject to 
asset forfeiture under the Reform Act.116 
While Congress billed CAFRA as a widespread solution to limiting 
past abuses of civil forfeiture laws, it has been far from limiting.117  
Instead of the extensive reform that Representatives Hyde and Conyers 
sought to accomplish with the bill, the Act took the shape of a much 
more restricted reform.118  In reality, it addressed only specific issues in 
areas of the law that were frequently encountered by both the 
government in prosecuting the case and the defense in representing the 
property owners.119 
Issues stemming from this restricted reform are largely prevalent 
and it is generally believed that, “to return forfeiture to its pure and 
proper form, where the motivation underlying the process is not one of 
 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012). Kessler, supra note 4. 
116. Civil Asset Forfeiture, CCIM INST. (July 2006), http://www.ccim.com/sites/ 
default/files/ccim-briefing-paper_civil-asset-forfeiture.pdf.  
117. Kessler, supra note 4. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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greed and fund-raising, requires revision of the system itself, an agenda 
left unaddressed by the tweakings to the statutes made by the Reform 
Act.”120  While seemingly providing greater protection to property 
owners than civil asset forfeiture laws had previously, the Act itself does 
little to hinder law enforcement’s ability to seize property that may have 
been used in the facilitation of a crime.121 
II. THE ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN FROM THE CIVIL ASSET 
FORFEITURE REFORM ACT OF 2000 
The following two sections of this Note address issues that citizens 
face under the current standards set forth in CAFRA and propose further 
reform that the government should implement to avoid continued abuse 
of civil asset forfeiture statutes.  This section of the Note argues that the 
current standards under CAFRA are not as limiting on law 
enforcement’s ability to seize property, which may have been involved 
in a crime, as Congress intended when changing the civil asset forfeiture 
reform laws.122  As evidenced by the district court’s decision in United 
States v. 434 Main Street, innocent property owners continue to face a 
nearly insurmountable burden in order to retain the rights to their seized 
property.123  The current practices of federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies undermine the intentions of CAFRA sponsors in 
proposing the Act.124  Such practices hinder the ability of state 
governments to establish stricter standards of their own, which would 
provide greater protection for property owners, under state laws, against 
civil asset forfeiture.125  The conflict between state and federal civil asset 
forfeiture laws has arisen because of the ability of state and local law 
enforcement officials to bypass stricter state laws in order to reap the 
 
120. Id. 
121. See id. (“For the moment, as with any compromise, the Act leaves both sides 
somewhat dissatisfied.  Prosecutors and police organizations, reaping the benefits of the law 
prior to this Act, adopted the adage ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,’ while the defense bar often 
felt it was conceding too much for little in return.  In the end, the Act appears to carry through 
a large part of the reform agenda without limiting law enforcement’s use of forfeiture as an 
effective tool against crime.”). 
122. See 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012); see also United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 
2d 298, 318 (D. Mass. 2013) (citations omitted) (“CAFRA ‘heightens the government’s 
evidentiary burden in civil forfeitures.’  Previously, the government only had to demonstrate 
probable cause that a property was subject to forfeiture, at which time the burden shifted to the 
claimant ‘to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was not subject 
to forfeiture.’  The government’s burden of showing probable cause was ‘a relatively light 
burden.’”). 
123. United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
124. Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 40, at 13. 
125. Id. 
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benefits of the more easily attained federal standard under CAFRA.126 
Part II.A of this Note reviews the preliminary burden of proof on 
the government required to seize property under CAFRA and highlights 
the potential for abuse of the statute by federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officials under this current standard.  Part II.B scrutinizes 
the “equitable sharing” program established under CAFRA and explores 
how state and local authorities are able to bypass tougher state and local 
laws to implement the more revenue friendly federal program.  Part II.C 
establishes the negative impact the Act has on public policy and 
illustrates that CAFRA is an incentive-based system that encourages law 
enforcement to seize innocent property for the benefit of federal, state 
and local budgets.127  Part II.D details the practice of allowing CAFRA-
seized funds to go undocumented in law enforcement budgets and the 
widespread negative impact of this type of system. 
A. Government’s Preliminary Burden of “Preponderance of the 
Evidence” Allows for Seizure of Assets with Little to No Connection 
to a Crime 
With the implementation of CAFRA, the Senate and the House of 
Representatives compromised on the initial burden of proof required for 
law enforcement to seize the property in question.128  The relevant 
language of the statute reads: 
(c) Burden of proof.—In a suit or action brought under any civil 
forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property— 
(1) the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to 
forfeiture; (2) the Government may use evidence gathered after the 
filing of a complaint for forfeiture to establish, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that property is subject to forfeiture. . . .129 
 
126. Id. 
127. The term “innocent” property refers to the long held legal fiction, used in civil 
asset forfeiture proceedings, “that the property itself is the defendant in the case—and not the 
owner.  Because the property is ‘guilty’, the fiction goes, it can be forfeited without respect to 
the rights of its owner(s), because property, not being a person, has no constitutional rights.”  
See Brenda Grantland, The Department of “Justice” and Other Legal Fictions, 1 F.E.A.R. 
CHRONICLES 3 (Aug. 1992) available at http://www.fear.org/chron/editoria1_3.txt. 
128. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 3, 114 
STAT. 202, 212 (2000) (the proposed House of Representatives bill called for a preliminary 
“clear and convincing” burden on the government); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 11 n. 
47 (revised report that established the “preponderance of the evidence” standard once it was 
clear that the House of Representatives and the Senate were not going to come to an 
agreement on a “clear and convincing” standard of proof). 
129. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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After satisfying the preliminary burden that the disputed property is 
“more likely than not” connected to drug activity, the property is subject 
to forfeiture and the burden subsequently shifts to the property owner to 
disprove the accusations.130  Raising the preliminary burden on the 
government from the pre-CAFRA “probable cause” standard to the post-
CAFRA “preponderance of the evidence” standard was supposed to 
ensure that law enforcement officials would be required to make a more 
substantial connection between the property and the suspected crime.131  
In reality, this change has done little to provide greater protection to 
property owners.132 
In early 2013, the federal government seized the entire bank 
account of a family-run grocery store in Michigan without giving 
warning to the owners because the government alleged that the owners 
had been structuring their deposits to avoid tax liability.133  However, 
only nine months prior, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) conducted 
an investigation into the grocery store and cleared the owners of any 
wrongdoing.134  The IRS established that the family frequently made 
smaller deposits not to avoid tax liability, but because they held a typical 
small business insurance policy that significantly limited their insurance 
coverage if a theft were to occur.135 
Although the owners were cleared of any wrongdoing and were 
never charged with a crime in connection with any government 
investigation, the preliminary burden of proof on the government, that it 
was more likely than not that the money in the bank account seized by 
the government was attained through the facilitation of a crime, was 
met.136  In the ongoing litigation, the owners of the grocery store now 
bear the burden of proving, at their own expense, that the money was not 
used in the facilitation of a crime.137 
With the increase of the preliminary burden to a “preponderance of 
 
130. See Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 30, at 4 (“[W]ith civil forfeiture, 
property owners are effectively guilty until proven innocent.  The increased burden (including 
substantial legal costs) of proving one’s innocence can result in owners abandoning rightful 
claims to seized property.  And if owners do not fight civil forfeiture and the government wins 
by default, law enforcement agencies are more likely to engage in it.”). 
131. Randy Balko, Forfeiture Folly: Cover Your Assets, REASON (Apr. 2008), available 
at http://reason.com/archives/2008/03/07/forfeiture-folly. 
132. Id. 
133. Michigan Forfeiture Victims To Get Their Day in Court: IRS Must Produce 
Witnesses to Explain Forfeiture Practices, INST. FOR JUST. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://ij.org/ 
michigan-civil-forfeiture-release-11-08-2013. 
134. Id. 
135. Id.   
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
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the evidence” standard under CAFRA, it was widely assumed that the 
heightened burden would result in fewer seizures.138  However, that has 
not been the case, as “courts have been steadily mitigating the 2000 
bill’s impact, both by narrowly interpreting the protections it grants 
defendants and by being overly deferential to prosecutors when 
determining if they’ve met the new evidentiary standard.”139  Allowing 
seizures in such cases where the court has been deferential in 
determining if the preponderance standard has been met sets forth a 
slippery slope for the future of civil asset forfeiture cases. 
Permitting cases to go forward under the current CAFRA 
evidentiary burden only serves to benefit the government in its seizure of 
goods, and inexcusably shifts a higher burden to property owners.140  
Requiring such a low preliminary burden of proof, even though it was 
seemingly increased under CAFRA, will further serve to burden 
innocent property owners.141 
If such a minimal burden of proof remains, a continued potential for 
abuse will exist.  In recent years the revenue generated through civil 
asset forfeiture in this country has grown exponentially.142  Considering 
how the preponderance standard has been interpreted post-CAFRA, law 
enforcement officials may have the ability to create faulty scenarios in 
order to seize property that they know to be innocent.143 
Such schemes may be made possible simply by allowing law 
enforcement to meet the low burden of proof that it is more likely than 
not that the property in question is connected to a crime.144  Eighty 
percent of all forfeitures go uncontested.145  As officials are aware that 
many forfeitures are uncontested, they can reasonably assume that the 
property they seize will not be sought after in court.146  The cost of 
 
138. Balko, supra note 131. 
139. Id. 
140. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 6-7 (“In 2008, for the first time in history, the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF) held more than $1 billion in net assets— that is, money forfeited 
from property owners and now available for federal law enforcement activities after deducting 
various expenses.  A similar fund at the U.S. Treasury Department held more than $400 
million in net assets in 2008.  By contrast, in 1986, the year after the AFF was created, it took 
in just $93.7 million in deposits.”). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id.  (Note that eighty percent of all forfeitures go uncontested by property owners 
not because the property owners do not have legitimate cases to retain their property.  Instead, 
such a large amount of forfeitures go uncontested because the cost (in time, effort, and money) 
to defend against a seizure is high and oftentimes the effort to retain the property may end up 
costing the wronged property owner more than the property itself is worth). 
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litigation is often too much for the property owners to fight the 
seizure.147  In such situations, it is likely that law enforcement officials 
would be willing to take their chances in the seizing of the property, in 
the hopes of obtaining the revenue gained through the seizure. 
B. The “Equitable Sharing” Program Assists State and Local Law 
Enforcement in Bypassing Tougher State Civil Forfeiture Laws 
With CAFRA, the federal government established the federal civil 
asset forfeiture preliminary burden of proof as a “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard.148  However, states have retained the right to 
establish their own standards through the police powers granted under 
the Constitution.149  Nevertheless, through the federal government’s 
questionable “equitable sharing” program, state and local law 
enforcement have the ability to bypass state law that is less favorable to 
their intentions.  Therefore, state and local officials have the ability to 
satisfy the preponderance standard of proof if their state requires a 
stricter preliminary burden such as a “clear and convincing” or a 
“beyond reasonable doubt” standard.150 
The “equitable sharing” program was first introduced under the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.151  The program enables 
state and local law enforcement agencies to seize property that may not 
 
147. Id. 
148. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). 
149. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 40; see 
also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 47 (2014) (However, there are states that have a preliminary 
standard of proof even lower than the federal standard set forth in CAFRA.  The 
Massachusetts civil forfeiture statute requires, “the commonwealth shall have the burden of 
proving to the court the existence of probable cause to institute the action, and any such 
claimant shall then have the burden of proving that the property is not forfeitable.”). 
150. See Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 40, at 1 (“[W]ith equitable 
sharing, state and local law enforcement can take and profit from property they might not be 
able to under state law.  If a state provides owners greater protections or bars law enforcement 
from directly benefiting from forfeitures, agencies can simply turn to federal law.”); see also 
Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41 (“[F]ederal civil forfeiture laws 
encourage abuse by providing a loophole to law enforcement in states with good laws for 
property owners: ‘equitable sharing.’  With equitable sharing, state law enforcement can turn 
over seized assets to the federal government, or they may seize them jointly with federal 
officers. The property is then subject to federal civil forfeiture law—not state law.”).  See 
generally Cornell University Law School defines the “clear and convincing” evidentiary 
burden as, “a party must prove that it is substantially more likely than not that it is true,” 
LEGAL INFO. INST., available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_ 
evidence.  See generally NOLO’s Plain-English Law Dictionary, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/reasonable-doubt-term.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) 
(defining the beyond reasonable doubt evidentiary burden as, “the prosecutor must prove . . . 
guilt ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”). 
151. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41. 
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meet the preliminary burden to be seized under their own state laws and 
subsequently transfer it to federal agencies to apply the federal 
preponderance burden.152  In addition, the incentive for state and local 
authorities to use the “equitable sharing” program stems from the 
financial benefits that may be provided to these law enforcement 
officials under the Act.153 
State and local authorities may transfer the seized property to 
federal officials in the event that “the ‘conduct giving rise to the seizure 
is in violation of federal law and where federal law provides for 
forfeiture.’”154  In situations where state and local authorities transfer the 
seized property to federal authorities, under the federal “equitable 
sharing” program, they are entitled to as much as eighty percent of the 
profits made from the seized property, even if relevant state law limits or 
prohibits profit-based incentives.155 
Moreover, the incentive for state and local officials to avoid state 
law and apply federal law is great.156  If property is seized through the 
“equitable sharing” program, “the federal government requires that any 
funds distributed through equitable sharing arrangements be used solely 
to fund law enforcement activities, even for agencies in states where law 
enforcement receives none of the proceeds from state forfeitures.”157  
Additional provisions of the “equitable sharing” program allow for 
profits made from seizure of assets through the program to pay for state 
and local taskforce officer salaries, even if the laws of the particular state 
would prohibit forfeiture profits from funding such a position.158 
With such incentives for state and local officials to bypass the 
provisions set forth by their own states and enforce the federal “equitable 
sharing” provisions, the Constitutional powers of the states are infringed 
upon and such a system undermines the power regulated to the states.159  
For example, 
law enforcement agencies in states where at least a portion of 
forfeiture proceeds must be used for non-law enforcement purposes 
had significantly higher levels of equitable sharing payments than 
agencies where law enforcement could keep the proceeds.  The 
results suggest that law enforcement agencies in states that require 
 
152. Id. at 12. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 25.  
157. Id.  
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 26-27. 
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law enforcement to share forfeiture proceeds are more likely to 
engage in equitable sharing in order to avoid state restrictions.160 
The program encourages both state and local officials to abandon 
stricter state policies simply because of financial incentives provided by 
the federal system.161  Additionally, it forces agencies to abandon the 
idea of protecting innocent property owners and instead encourages them 
to become solely revenue-driven entities. 
C. Incentive-Based System Encourages Civil Asset Forfeiture and 
Hinders Public Policy 
Under CAFRA, law enforcement authorities involved in the seizure 
of the assets in question are entitled to keep a portion, and in some cases, 
all of the proceeds collected through the seizure.162  In fact, “given the 
structures and incentives of civil forfeiture law, a substantial number of 
law enforcement agencies are now dependent on civil forfeiture proceeds 
and view civil forfeiture as a necessary source of income.”163  This 
incentive of authorities getting to keep large portions of the funds 
generated through the seizure of assets creates concern that the 
authorities involved may act in such a way that they are “policing for 
profit.”164  Such a practice essentially means that law enforcement 
agencies may actively chase forfeitures to pad their budgets at the 
expense of more legitimate enforcement behavior.165  This theory hinges 
on the idea that because incentives such as increased paychecks, larger 
budgets, new equipment, and specialized training, among others, are 
threatened without the proper funding, law enforcement officials are not 
going to be in a position to go above and beyond their standard duty to 
 
160. Id. at 26-27; see also id. at 7 (“Law enforcement agencies in states with no profit 
motive (no forfeiture profits to law enforcement) will receive more in equitable sharing than 
agencies in states with a 100-percent profit motive—an increase of $30,000 per year for an 
average-sized law enforcement agency, representing an increase of 25 percent of equitable 
sharing dollars.”). 
161. See Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2009), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ri/projects/esguidelines.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2014).  
162. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 6. 
163. Id. at 12; see also id. (“[According] to a survey of nearly 800 law enforcement 
executives. . . nearly 40 percent of police agencies reported that civil forfeiture proceeds were 
a necessary budget supplement. . . . [T]his dependency is also present at the federal level, 
where the Department of Justice in the past has urged its lawyers to increase their civil 
forfeiture efforts so as to meet the Department’s annual budget targets.”).  
164. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41. 
165. Id. 
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protect the best interests of the public at large.166 
Instead, officials are incentivized to seize the opportunity to acquire 
some additional funds, and when it arises, they can confiscate any and all 
potentially forfeitable assets, largely at the expense of proper justice.167  
This theory alone identifies a significant public policy issue through the 
use of civil forfeiture.  The use of such laws creates tension between the 
objectives of law enforcement officials and the public that they are 
sworn to protect.  When law enforcement officials are dependent on civil 
asset forfeiture funds, it undermines the very foundation upon which 
they serve.  Their mission is protecting the rights of the public, and their 
duty as public service officers is significantly hindered by such profit-
driven motives.168 
The incentive-based system of “policing for profit” under current 
civil asset forfeiture laws has grown exponentially in recent years, 
largely due in part to the economic crisis in this country.169  As federal, 
state, and local law enforcement budgets get tighter and more precarious 
due to a lack of funding,170 it is only natural that these agencies turn to 
other programs to try to raise revenue. 
The idea that such agencies have turned to civil asset forfeiture as a 
means of raising revenue is exemplified by the fact that, “in 1986, the 
second year after the creation of the Department of Justice Assets 
Forfeiture Fund, the Fund took in $93.7 million in proceeds from 
forfeited assets.  By 2008, the Fund for the first time in history topped $1 
billion in net assets.”171  As of 2011, the Fund had grown as large as $1.8 
billion.172  It is important to note that, “[i]n addition to the fund’s size, 
payments from the fund to local law enforcement agencies totalled [sic] 
$445 million in 2011, another all-time high.”173  Increased dependence 
 
166. Scott Bullock & Vanita Gupta, End Policing for Profit, HUFF.POST, (June 12, 
2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-bullock/end-policing-for-
profit_b_534553.html. 
167. Id. 
168. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41. 
169. See id. at 12 (“The difference between self-interest in the public and private 
spheres is that the private citizen must persuade to achieve his ends, while the government 
official can employ force.  It is therefore a constant threat that those in positions of power will 
use that force to serve their own self-interest at the expense of the broader populace.  This 
concern reaches its zenith when government officials stand to aggrandize themselves by 
seizing individuals’ private property for their own benefit.”). 
170. Id. at 11. 
171. Id. 
172. Mike Riggs, Federal Asset Forfeiture Continues to Skyrocket Under Obama, 
REASON (July 31, 2012), http://reason.com/blog/2012/07/31/federal-asset-forfeiture-
skyrockets-unde. 
173. Id. 
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on such funds only further serves to guarantee federal, state, and local 
law enforcement abuse of CAFRA requirements, which largely hinders 
the public policy incentive of such agencies to provide a protective 
service to the general public.174 
D. Funds Seized Through CAFRA Go Largely Undocumented in Law 
Enforcement Budgets 
Another troubling aspect of civil asset forfeiture arises once the 
government has seized the property in question.  The federal, state, and 
local law enforcement authorities involved in the seizure under CAFRA 
are entitled to some, if not all, of the profits that stem from the seized 
property.175  Even more troubling, however, is that once the profit is 
obtained, state and local law enforcement officials are largely not 
required to report how the money was obtained, to which parts of the 
budget the profit was allocated, or how the funds were spent by the 
department.176  It is difficult to determine where the money comes from 
and where it goes in such budgets because as it stands, there are only 
twenty-nine states that require such information on civil asset forfeiture 
funds be documented.177  Of the data that has been collected, however, it 
is clear that federal, state, and local law enforcement officials use profits 
collected through asset forfeiture extensively.178 
With very little regulation as to how federal, state, and local 
forfeiture assets are spent; law enforcement agencies are afforded the 
opportunity to use these funds in any manner that they deem to be 
necessary.179  For example, a 2007 audit of a Georgian district attorney’s 
office highlighted a number of potential abuses of allowing agencies 
seemingly free reign: 
According to auditor’s reports, almost one-third of the 376 checks 
written out of the asset forfeiture account in 2006 were either 
 
174. See Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 18, 20 (“An 
example of how law enforcement maintains its ‘addiction’ to forfeiture funds is the practice of 
‘reverse stings,’ in which police pose as drug sellers rather than buyers.  Forfeiture advocates’ 
claims of ‘preventing crime and putting major offenders away’ are inconsistent with [such 
practices]. . . . Instead, law enforcement targets buyers rather than sellers because buyers tend 
to have more cash on hand subject to forfeiture.”) (footnote omitted). 
175. Id. at 9. 
176. Id. at 8, 13 (“Public accountability over civil asset forfeiture in the states is 
extremely limited.  Only 29 states clearly require law enforcement to collect and report 
forfeiture data, and just 19 of those states responded to freedom-of-information requests with 
usable data—and the data provided were often meager.  In most states, we know nothing or 
next-to-nothing about the use of civil forfeiture or its proceeds.”). 
177. Id. at 27. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 13. 
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questionable or not allowed under federal guidelines.  Those 
questionable expenses totaled more than $2 million.  Under federal 
asset forfeiture laws, money seized by the feds and handed over to 
state law enforcement may only be used for law enforcement 
purposes.  But [the] [d]istrict [a]ttorney . . . has a very expansive 
view of just what that means. . . . [The] asset forfeiture fund 
spending included: . . . $5,150 for benefits, dinners, football tickets, 
fundraisers, and balls sponsored by various civic organizations – 
none of them directly related to law enforcement; $5,500 spent on 
rent and catering for a staff Christmas party; $89 for a Superman-
style red cape with “Super Lawyer” printed on it that an assistant 
prosecutor was encouraged to wear at the Christmas party; $150 for a 
dinner party to celebrate the conviction of a murderer; and $9,100 for 
Howard’s perfect attendance program for students in Atlanta’s public 
elementary schools.180 
Furthermore, the district attorney justified the questionable 
spending of the asset forfeiture funds by arguing that they were effective 
crime fighting expenditures that benefited the purposes of law 
enforcement and provided an increase in office morale, stating, “[w]e 
cannot pay our employees bonuses.  We can’t pay overtime. . . . I tried to 
come up with ways to increase morale.”181  The problem that the auditors 
had in trying to determine if the spending of the funds was in violation 
of federal civil asset forfeiture laws was that it was impossible to 
determine exactly where the funds originated.182  There were a number 
of federal funds intermingled in one bank account, making it difficult to 
determine which of the funds had been spent on each expense.183 
By allowing federal, state, and local law enforcement officials 
continued opportunities for abuse, as exemplified in Georgia,184 
exploitation of civil asset forfeiture will continue to run rampant among 
law enforcement agencies.  Furthermore, public perception of spending 
of forfeiture-seized funds will only grow more negative in the years to 
come.185 
 
180. Phillip Smith, Law Enforcement: Asset Forfeiture Funds Spent on Banquets, Balls, 
and Balloons in Atlanta, DRUG WAR CHRONICLE (Sept. 14, 2007), http://stopthedrugwar.org/ 
chronicle/2007/sep/14/law_enforcement_asset_forfeiture. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. 
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III. REFORMING CAFRA: ENHANCING THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH 
BY CAFRA WILL LEGITIMIZE CONGRESS’S INTENTIONS FOR THE ACT 
This section of the Note focuses on potential options for CAFRA 
reform.  Though Congress’s intent in passing the Act was to impose 
tougher civil asset forfeiture standards, in practice this has not taken 
effect.186  Part III.A asserts the need to raise the government’s 
preliminary burden of proof to a “clear and convincing” standard, which 
would provide more protection for property owners, as it requires the 
government to provide more substantial evidence before seizing any 
property in question. 
Part III.B explains that requiring a higher preliminary standard of 
proof on the government would serve to eliminate the questionable 
“equitable sharing program” because state and local authorities would no 
longer simply be able to bypass more stringent state laws in favor of a 
more forgiving federal law.  Part III.C proposes requiring federal, state, 
and local authorities to disclose where and how funds collected through 
civil asset forfeiture will be distributed and applied. 
A. Raising the Government’s Preliminary Burden of Proof Provides 
More Protection to the Public 
This Section discusses how different states have approached the 
preliminary standard of proof required of the state in civil forfeiture 
cases.187  Analysis of individual state statutes and practices supports the 
assertion that raising the government’s preliminary burden of proof in 
federal civil asset forfeiture cases will help to eliminate law 
enforcement’s abuse of CAFRA.188  As it stands, North Carolina is the 
only state in the country that does not allow for civil forfeiture, allowing 
forfeiture only after the owner of a property has been convicted of a 
crime.189  Only two states, Wisconsin and Nebraska, require the criminal 
burden that the property be connected to the crime “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” before the property can be seized.190  However, there are a 
number of states that have adopted the “clear and convincing” 
 
186. See Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded 
Government Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97 
(2001) (discussing the initial intent of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in 
their proposed bills prior to the adoption of the Act).  
187. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 109 (discussing and 
grading the civil asset forfeiture laws for every state, and establishing how they apply their 
standard and how effective the state’s statute has been in practice).  
188. Id. at 41.  
189. Id. at 80.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2.3 (2014). 
190. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 74, 101; see Wis 
Stat.. § 961.555 (2014). 
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evidentiary burden, which requires that the government show that it is 
“substantially more likely than not” that the property in question was 
involved in the facilitation of a crime.191  This evidentiary standard 
provides greater protection to the public.192  It requires a more 
substantial showing that the property in question has been involved in a 
crime and would make it harder for law enforcement officials to seize 
property with limited proof.193 
The “clear and convincing” evidentiary burden is the standard of 
proof originally advocated for by the Representatives introducing civil 
asset forfeiture reform.194  They did so because they recognized the 
widespread potential for abuse of forfeiture laws if a low preliminary 
burden of proof were utilized.195  Since the introduction of the Act, the 
abuses of the current standard have only grown more rampant, and 
therefore support for an increased “clear and convincing” standard is 
likely to be more widespread. 
B. Eliminate the Revenue Based “Equitable Sharing Program” 
In order for the proposed increase of the preliminary evidentiary 
burden to a “clear and convincing” standard of proof to be successful, 
the federal government would also have to phase out the controversial 
“equitable sharing” program.  Because the “equitable sharing” program 
encourages state and local officials to circumvent their state’s own laws 
in favor of seizure of the property under federal regulations, increasing 
the federal burden of proof under CAFRA would be ineffective unless 
the “equitable sharing” program is eliminated.196  Under the program, 
state and local officials have the ability to work with federal officials to 
seize property under federal law, based solely on the fact that they are 
seeking to bypass stricter state laws and attain greater revenue based 
incentives.197  Eliminating the program altogether would end such 
practices, as there would be no financial incentives to hand over the 
seized assets to the federal government. 
 
191. See Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 22 (establishing 
that ten states currently place a preliminary “clear and convincing” evidentiary burden on law 
enforcement officials before seizure of the property in question).  For the definition of “clear 
and convincing” see Cornell University Law School, LEGAL INFO. INST., available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_evidence. 
192. See Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 22. 
193. See “Clear and Convincing Evidence,” supra note 107.  
194. Hyde, supra note 103. 
195. Id.; see also Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 2, 
114 STAT. 202, 205-06 (2000). 
196. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 6, 12. 
197. Carpenter II, Salzman & Knepper, supra note 40, at 1. 
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C. Require Full Disclosure as to the Apportionment of Civil Forfeiture 
Funds to Help Eliminate Incentive-Based System 
As it stands, there is very little regulation as to how civil asset 
forfeiture funds are apportioned and accounted for within federal, state, 
and local budgets.198  This lack of specific accountability leads to 
questions about how much money and other assets are actually acquired 
through such practices.199  Mandatory disclosure of the location of such 
assets would bring more attention to the fact that civil asset forfeiture 
standards have been abused in the recent past and will help to limit such 
abuse in the future.  Requiring all federal, local, and state agencies to 
document, track, and report all profit and how such profit is distributed 
amongst agencies is the only way to ensure that abuse of civil asset 
forfeiture laws does not continue.200 
Some states have already created, or are in the process of 
attempting to create, strict regulations about how such funding should be 
accounted for, and they also seek to address how any and all profit 
should be spent.201  For example, proposed legislation in Massachusetts 
attempts to fairly carve out who should be entitled to such gains: 
The final order of the court shall provide that said monies and the 
proceeds of any such sale shall be distributed in the following 
manner: thirty-four percent shall be distributed to the Senator 
Charles E. Shannon, Jr.  Community Safety Initiative Fund created 
pursuant to section 35U of chapter 10 of the general laws, thirty-
three percent to the prosecuting district attorney or attorney general, 
and thirty-three percent to the city, town, state, or metropolitan 
district police department involved in the seizure, provided, however, 
that more than one department was substantially involved in the 
seizure, the court having jurisdiction of the forfeiture proceeds shall 
equitably distribute said proceeds among those departments.202 
By providing explicit instructions as to how civil asset forfeiture 
funds should be allocated, and how they should be able to be used by 
law enforcement officials, state and federal officials can work to 
guarantee that the funds are spent legitimately in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Without reform, law enforcement’s abuse under CAFRA will 
 
198. Id. at 3. 
199. Id. 
200. Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic & Bullock, supra note 41, at 14.  
201. See H.R. 188 No. 1238, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2013). 
202. Id. 
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potentially increase exponentially.  If such potential is acted upon, a 
larger number of innocent property owners will have their property 
wrongfully seized.  The House of Representatives saw this potential for 
abuse when the initial reform was introduced; however, compromise led 
to a more lenient standard of proof on the government when it comes to 
the initial hurdle that it must overcome to seize the assets in question.203  
Under the current version of CAFRA, there are glaring issues that need 
to be addressed in order to hinder abuse of the law against the drafter’s 
intentions and protect the American public. 
The preliminary burden on the government requiring a 
“preponderance of the evidence” that the asset in question is subject to 
forfeiture is not a high enough standard and encourages law 
enforcement’s continued abuse of the intentions of the Act.  
Additionally, allowing for an “equitable sharing” program that helps 
state and local law enforcement officials circumvent stricter or less 
profitable state laws in favor of a more lenient federal law undermines 
the rights of the states.  Further, it encourages officials to cherry-pick the 
course of action that is most beneficial to their revenue based policing 
efforts.  Allowing for such incentive driven policing violates public 
policy.  Finally, the practice of permitting revenue that is raised through 
civil asset forfeiture to remain undocumented in local, state, and, federal 
budgets only further encourages questionable behavior of law 
enforcement. 
Reform of civil asset forfeiture laws must be undertaken if the 
public ever hopes to obtain treatment that is to be considered fair under 
the law in regard to such forfeitures.  The preliminary burden of proof on 
the government needs to be raised from the preponderance standard to a 
stricter “clear and convincing” standard.  Heightening the preliminary 
burden will require law enforcement to produce additional evidence to 
prove that the asset in question is subject to forfeiture.  It will 
additionally serve to protect indigent property owners who do not have 
the means to oppose such wrongful seizures, which can occur under such 
a low burden of proof. 
Additionally, the “equitable sharing” program must be 
discontinued.  It encourages state and local agencies to circumvent 
legitimate state laws in hopes of acquiring more revenue.  Such actions 
violate the very principles that our law enforcement agencies were 
established to promote.  Finally, the allocation of civil forfeiture 
acquired revenue needs to be documented and made public knowledge.  
 
203. Cassella, supra note 186. 
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If law enforcement agencies continue to be given the opportunity to 
conceal the revenue that they acquire through civil asset forfeiture in 
budgets, salaries, and new equipment the practice of abusing the law will 
continue and reform will be largely unsuccessful. 
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